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Abstract  
This paper studies the effect of housing allowance on rents using discontinuities 
in the Finnish housing allowance system as a quasi-experimental setting. The 
stepwise dependence of housing allowance on the floor area of the dwelling and 
the year of construction of the building allows us to isolate the impact of the 
generosity of housing allowance from other determinants of rents. The 
discontinuities in the amount of housing allowances at the studied cut-offs are 
economically and statistically significant. However, our results show that there 
are no discontinuities in rents of the recipient households at these cut-offs. 
Instead, differences in the amount of the housing allowance are translated 
roughly one-to-one into differences in the rent net of housing allowance.  
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1 Introduction	
In most countries, governments subsidize the housing consumption of low-income households 
through various, often overlapping housing programs. Over the last few decades, the general 
trend has been towards less construction of social housing and increased reliance on direct 
subsidies for low-income households. Given this tendency, it is vital to understand the effects 
of these direct subsidies and to be aware of how the details of the programs affect their 
efficiency and distributional effects.      
A typical feature of housing allowance (henceforth HA) programs is that the subsidy depends 
on the characteristics of the household, such as income and household size. In addition, the 
subsidy is typically more generous in more expensive areas and also depends on other unit 
characteristics related to rent. The aim of these details is to level the out-of-pocket rents (rent 
net of housing allowance) and non-housing consumption of recipients. However, these 
differences likely affect the recipient households’ willingness to pay for rental housing, and 
could thereby affect their rents. If the incidence of differences in HA generosity is to a large 
extent on the landlords, the redistributive goals of the scheme are not achieved. 
In this paper, we study whether and to what degree differences in HA generosity for different 
housing units affect rents. We consider the Finnish HA system where the HA is capped by a 
rent ceiling which depends in a stepwise manner on the floor area of the unit and the 
construction year of the building. We test for the existence of a similar stepwise pattern in 
rents using a regression discontinuity type approach and register data covering the universe of 
HA recipients in Finland. The discontinuities provide a quasi-experimental setting to isolate 
the impact of housing allowance from other determinants of rent.   
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate our research design and present the main results. The dots 
correspond to the sample means by 0.5 m2 bins. The red vertical lines show the floor area cut-
offs where the rent ceiling changes, and the black lines represent 2nd order polynomials fitted 
separately for each interval between the cut-offs. Figure 1 shows that there are clearly visible 
discontinuities in the amount of HA at the cut-offs. In our econometric analysis, we 
demonstrate that, for example, crossing the first cut-off implies on average a 15 euro 
reduction in monthly HA which corresponds to a 6.7% decrease in HA or 1.9% decrease in 
income (including HA). Figure 2, in turn, shows that the relationship between floor area and 
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rent does not have a similar stepwise pattern. This suggests that the differences in HA are not 
capitalized into rents.  
 
Figure 1. Floor area and monthly HA per square meter. 
 
Figure 2. Floor area and monthly rent per square meter. 
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In an instrumental variables regression, utilizing the discontinuities as instruments, we again 
find no effect of the HA on the rents of recipient households. The upper limit of the 95% 
confidence interval for our preferred estimate for the effect of a 1 euro higher housing 
allowance is about 0.2 euros, which is low in comparison to many previous estimates. A 
potential explanation for the finding is that demand responses to the structure of the subsidy 
scheme are muted by moving costs and short expected HA spells. Consistent with this idea, 
we find some indication of rent effects when we focus on long-term HA recipients or flats 
inhabited by HA recipients for several years. 
We contribute to the small literature on the incidence of housing demand subsidies by 
utilizing a plausibly exogenous source of variation in HA generosity. Our paper is closely 
related to the studies analyzing reforms which change the parameters of the scheme and 
therefore affect the distribution of benefits across households. Our finding that the incidence 
of differences in HA scheme is largely on the tenant is in contrast with most previous studies, 
but in line with the recent study by Brewer et al. (2014) on the UK system. 
In the UK, housing benefit is capped by a rent ceiling and is means-tested above an income 
limit which depends on household characteristics. Gibbons and Manning (2006) study a 
reform which lowered the rent ceiling for new claimants in 1996 and 1997 without affecting 
the benefits enjoyed by existing claimants. The results indicate that roughly 60% of the 
housing benefit reduction was passed on to landlords in the form of lower rents. Brewer et al. 
(2014) study a similar reform in 2011 and compare new claimants before and after the reform. 
Their results suggest that the incidence is 90% on the tenants, but they also report substantial 
variation between claimant groups. According to Brewer et al. (2014), the two reforms 
affected different segments of the rent distribution with potentially different demand 
elasticities. This could explain the contradictory results of the two studies.  
Fack (2006) and Laferrère and Le Blanc (2004) study French reforms which extended the 
housing subsidy program to households not previously eligible. Both studies find that the 
rents of housing benefit claimants increased faster than those of non-claimants after the 
reforms.  
Collison and Ganong (2016) in turn study two different reforms of the US voucher1 system. In 
the first reform, in 2005, the fair market rents (FMRs) determining the local rent ceilings were 
                                                 
1 The US voucher system is very different form the Finnish HA system. A household is eligible for a voucher if 
its income is low enough relative to the local income level. If a household receives a voucher, it needs to find an 
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revised which created exogenous geographic variation in the rent ceiling revisions. The 
results suggest that increases in rent ceilings did not induce demand changes but increased the 
rents of voucher recipients.2 In the second reform, the metropolitan area level FMR was 
replaced with zip code level FMRs in Dallas. The reform effectively reduced the out-of-
pocket rent of voucher recipients in expensive neighborhoods relative to low-cost 
neighborhoods. The results suggest that the reform shifted housing demand of voucher 
recipients from low-cost neighborhoods to expensive neighborhoods and led to rent increases 
in expensive and rent reductions in low-cost neighborhoods. 
Also in Finland, two previous studies have analyzed the incidence of HAs exploiting variation 
in the rent ceilings used in calculating the HA. The comparison of our analysis to the previous 
Finnish studies highlights the importance of a credible research design and transparent 
empirical analysis. Viren (2013) regresses rents on maximum achievable HA. His results 
suggest that 30–50% of the HA is shifted to rents while our results imply a much smaller rent 
effect. We argue that the internal validity of our research design is higher as we focus on the 
discontinuities in the rent ceilings at certain cut-offs that generate plausibly exogenous 
variation in the allowance, and perform extensive robustness and validity checks.  
Kangasharju (2010) utilizes the reform of 2002 as a source of exogenous variation to analyze 
the impact of HA on rents. The main result is that one additional euro in HA led to a 60–70 
cent increase in the rents paid by the claimants relative to non-claimants. In Appendix B of 
this paper, we repeat the analysis of the 2002 reform using the same data and the methods 
described in Kangasharju (2010) but find different results. In particular, we do not find 
evidence of substantial effects on rents.  
When interpreting the results, it is important to note that our analysis is not directly 
informative about the effects of the overall size of the HA system. The overall rental effects 
are studied by Eriksen and Ross (2015) who analyze the impact of changes in the US housing 
voucher program. They exploit two reforms which increased the supply of housing vouchers 
to a varying degree in different metropolitan areas. The results indicate that increased supply 
                                                                                                                                                        
apartment which satisfies the requirements of the program. Finally, the size of the subsidy is calculated based on 
local rent ceilings which the housing authorities set based on the local FMR determined by the US Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
2 For most recipients, the rent was below the rent ceiling before the reform. This means that their out-of-pocket 
rent is a fixed share of their income and not affected by their rent.  
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of vouchers did not affect the overall rental rate3 but shifted demand from lower quality units 
towards higher quality units. 
2 The	institutional	setting	
2.1 The	housing	allowance	system	
The Finnish housing allowance program consists of three parts: general HA, HA for 
pensioners and housing supplement for students. The program is financed by the government 
through the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela). We focus on the general HA, 
which is intended for working age low-income households and is the most important tenant-
based housing subsidy system in terms of the number of recipients and total outlays.  
Our data cover the years 2008 to 2013.4 In 2013, general HA expenditures were roughly 670 
million euros (Kela, 2014) which amounts to 0.34% of GDP. In December 2013, roughly 
eight percent of population under the age of 65 years received the general HA. The average 
monthly allowance was about 280 euros. 
Eligibility for the HA is based on pre-tax income, financial wealth and household size but 
does not depend on whether the tenant lives in private rental housing or social housing. The 
allowance is determined by the following formula:5  
(1)                              ܪܣ ൌ 0.8 ∗ ሾminሺܴ݁݊ݐ, ܴ݁݊ݐ௠௔௫ሻ െ ݀݁݀ݑܿݐܾ݈݅݁ሿ 
First, the allowance covers rents up to a maximum compensable rent (Rentmax) which depends 
on the floor area and rent of the unit. 1) If the floor area of the unit exceeds the floor area 
ceiling, the excess floor area is neglected when calculating the HA (Rentmax = floor area 
ceiling / floor area × Rent). The floor area ceiling depends positively on household size. 2) If 
the rent per square meter exceeds the rent ceiling, the excess rent is neglected when 
calculating the HA (Rentmax = rent ceiling × floor area). The rent ceiling depends on the floor 
area of the unit, the construction (or major renovation) year and location of the building. 3) If 
                                                 
3 This finding is in contrast with the results in Susin (2002). 
4 The general HA (yleinen asumistuki) was reformed in the beginning of 2015. As our data cover the time period 
between 2008 and 2013, in what follows we will describe the system as it existed before this recent reform. 
5 Lyytikäinen (2008) provides a more detailed description of the system. 
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both the floor area ceiling and the rent ceiling are exceeded then Rentmax = rent ceiling × floor 
area ceiling.  
The HA system imposes no constraints on the choice of the rental unit, and the rent paid by a 
HA recipient often exceeds the maximum compensable rent. In this case, the tenant pays the 
remainder of the rent entirely out-of-pocket.  
Second, the allowance is means-tested and involves a deductible if household income exceeds 
an income limit which depends on the household size. Above the income limit, the deductible 
increases with pre-tax income and is lower for larger households. The allowance covers 80% 
of the difference between the actual rent (or the maximum compensable rent) and the 
deductible.  
Finnish municipalities are divided into four regions according to housing affordability. The 
city of Helsinki forms region 1. Region 2 consists of the rest of the Helsinki Metropolitan 
Area (HMA). Region 3 includes 30 medium sized towns, and region 4 is the rest of Finland. 
Each affordability region has its own rent ceilings with the highest rent ceilings in Helsinki. 
The income limits in turn are the same in regions 1 and 2 and lower in the other two regions.  
The tenant applies for the HA from Kela and typically the HA is paid to the tenant. However, 
when applying for the HA, the household can also authorize Kela to pay the subsidy directly 
to the landlord. In our estimation sample about 26% of the recipients choose this alternative. 
In these cases, the landlord knows not only the recipient status of the tenant but also the 
amount of subsidy received.  
As an example, Table 1 shows the rent ceilings in medium-sized towns (region 3) in 2012. 
Our estimation strategy exploits the feature that the rent ceiling is a step function of the unit 
size and the construction year of the building. The floor area and construction year cut-offs 
are the same for all affordability regions, but the rent ceilings and the size of the jump at the 
cut-offs vary slightly from one affordability region to another.  
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Table 1. Rent ceilings (euro/m2 per month) as a function of floor area and construction year, 
affordability region 3, year 2012.  
  Construction year   
Floor area (m2) –1985 1986–1995 1996–
< 26 11.4 12.68 13.18
26 – 30.9 10.56 11.84 12.34
31 – 35.9 9.72 11 11.5 
36 – 45.9 9.27 10.64 11.15
46 – 60.9 8.96 10.26 10.76
61 – 80.9 8.76 9.82 10.33
> 81 8.68 9.74 10.24
 
As the table shows, the discontinuities in the schedule are quite large. For instance, for a 
housing unit of 35 square meters, the rent ceiling is 9.72 euros per square meter if the building 
is constructed in 1985, but is 13% higher (11 euros) if the building is constructed in 1986. 
That is, the maximum compensable monthly rent is 340.5 euros in a building constructed in 
1985 and 385.0 euros in a building constructed in 1986. In the same manner, the rent ceiling 
is 10.56 euros per square meter for a housing unit of size 30.5 square meters built in 1985, but 
is 8% lower if the floor area is 31 square meters. Translated into rent levels, this means that 
for a 30.5 square meter dwelling the maximum compensable monthly rent is 322.1 euros 
while for a 31 square meter dwelling, it is 301.3 euros.   
2.2 Social	housing	and	social	assistance	
The second major housing-related subsidy program in Finland is social rental housing 
intended mostly for low-income households. In 2008, roughly half of all rental housing was 
social housing, but the share of the social rental housing has been decreasing slightly over the 
last ten years.  
The social housing units are mainly owned by municipalities but also by various non-profit 
organizations. The owners receive subsidies from the municipality and the central government 
and commit to different types of regulation. For instance, the rents cannot be freely set but 
must be based on the capital and maintenance costs of the building. Because of the restrictions 
in rent setting, one would not expect the HA to affect rents in the social housing sector.  
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Finally, some HA recipients may also be entitled to social assistance available to households 
whose income and assets do not cover their necessary daily expenses, including housing. For 
these households, social assistance can cover up to 100% of the cost of housing.  
3 Potential	mechanisms	
Housing subsidy programs are targeted at low-income households with the aim of reducing 
the cost and improving the quality of housing. In broad terms, the programs directly affect 
recipient households’ disposable income but may affect households also through the 
allocation of households into rental housing units, through the effects on rental rates, and 
through the taxes required to finance the programs. At least in principle, the programs may 
also affect the overall stock of rental housing and its distribution. All these effects are likely 
to depend on the share of recipient households in the rental market, on the elasticity of rental 
housing demand and supply, and on how competitive the rental market is. 
If the rental housing market is characterized by substantial frictions, it is possible that an 
increase in the HA mainly affects the rents of recipient households. If rents are negotiated 
between the tenant and the landlord, the rent of any given unit may depend on the 
characteristics of the tenant, for instance the amount of housing allowance received.  
Recipient and non-recipient households may face different rental rates for other reasons too. 
For instance, if landlords perceive HA recipients to be more costly than other tenants due to, 
say, a higher risk of damage to the unit, HA recipients may face a rent premium. On the other 
hand, landlords may also view them as less risky because the housing authority at least partly 
guarantees a steady stream of rental payments. 
As our data only cover recipient households, we are unable to study the potential effects of 
the HA system on the overall rental rate or differences in rents paid by recipient and non-
recipient households. However, our data contain information about whether the HA was paid 
directly to the landlord which enables us to study whether the effects are heterogeneous in this 
respect. 
In the analysis, we exploit the discontinuities in the rent ceilings and focus on how differences 
in HA generosity translate into differences in rental rates among recipient households. Several 
issues may be important for the analysis and interpretation of the results. 
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First, as shown in Figure 1, the stepwise changes in the rent ceiling induce changes in the 
level of the HA around the cut-offs. Therefore, for recipient households, the willingness to 
pay should change at the cut-off while the incentives of non-recipients should not. This could 
mean that HA recipients are over-represented just below the floor area cut-offs and above the 
construction year cut-offs. The increased demand on the generous side of the cut-offs could 
lead to higher rents for these dwellings.  
A second issue concerns the behavioral responses of landlords. If the share of HA recipients is 
large, the demand incentives provided by the HA system could lead to changes in the overall 
rental housing stock. This type of supply response should reinforce discontinuities in the floor 
area and construction year distributions. We do not have data on the characteristics of the 
overall rental stock, but we can analyze the distribution of recipient households in the 
proximity of the cut-offs. This will allow us to make some inferences on the possible effects 
on the overall rental housing stock. 
In addition, the landlords’ incentive to maintain and renovate units changes at the cut-offs as 
recipient households’ willingness to pay for the units changes. As a result, it is possible that 
the rent level develops smoothly when crossing the cut-offs but discontinuities in the HA 
translate into discontinuities in quality-adjusted rents. This is an issue to be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results as we do not have data on the quality of units.  
Third, the incentives generated by the cut-offs may be weakened by other institutional details.  
For instance, optimizing housing choices precisely might be difficult if the rental market is 
thin with respect to the relevant unit characteristics (floor area and construction year). Also, 
the difference in the willingness to pay between two alternative, otherwise similar dwellings 
but with different levels of HA should depend on how long the household expects to rely on 
HA. Therefore, the demand responses around the cut-offs should depend on expected benefit 
duration. Finally, the incentives may also be muted because the social assistance system 
covers housing costs for HA recipients with very low incomes. Our data will allow us to 
address these concerns. We study whether the results are sensitive to differences in benefit 
duration. We also analyze separately a subsample of recipient households with income levels 
high enough not to be eligible for social assistance. For these households the incentives 
generated by the HA system should not be blurred by the availability of social assistance.   
Fourth, if the rent is below the rent ceiling, the tenant and the landlord may have an incentive 
to collude so as to maximize the HA received. In the Finnish system, the HA covers up to 
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80% of the rent. Therefore, the incentive to collude is not as high powered as, for instance, in 
the US voucher system where, below the rent ceiling, any increase in rent is entirely paid by 
the housing authority. In addition, as we will show in the next section, the vast majority of 
recipient households in the private rental market have rents above the rent ceiling. 
4 Empirical	analysis	
4.1 Data 
We use data on all HA recipients provided by Kela for the years 2008–2013. The data are 
originally monthly payment data. We keep only regular payments6 and collapse the data by 
address, recipient, monthly rent, monthly HA and year. We define cases where any of these 
five variables changes as new observations. 
We limit the analysis to dwellings with a floor area below 41 square meters because the 
discontinuities in HA are stronger for small flats than for larger flats. In addition, for small 
flats, the floor area ceilings are not binding and the whole floor area of the flat is typically 
taken into account when determining the HA. For larger flats, the floor area ceiling often 
becomes binding. In addition, because the floor area ceilings depend on the household size, 
they cause noise for bigger flats.  
As discussed in Section 2, rents in the social housing sector are set administratively and the 
rent ceilings are typically not binding. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the private rental 
market only, but report the results concerning the social housing sector in Appendix A.  
Figure 3 shows that there are clear discontinuities in the rent ceiling at all floor area cut-offs 
in our main estimation sample. For instance, on average the rent ceiling used to calculate the 
HA for flats with a floor area of 26m2 is slightly less than 12 euros and roughly 12.8 euros for 
flats with a floor area of 25.5m2. As the figure shows, there is also some variation in the rent 
ceiling away from the cut-offs. This is because the rent ceiling varies from one affordability 
region to another and also depends on the construction year of the building. The rent ceilings 
are also typically adjusted upwards each year. 
                                                 
6 We drop claw-backs and retrospective payments. 
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Figure 3. Floor area and monthly rent ceiling. 
The rent ceilings and income limits used in calculating the HA vary from one affordability 
region to another. Nevertheless, the rent ceiling is binding relatively infrequently in 
affordability region 4, which consists of small municipalities. In addition, rental market 
conditions may be quite different in rural areas than in large cities and towns.  Therefore, we 
leave out affordability region 4 from the analysis.7  
In regions 1–3, the rent ceilings are binding for over 80% of small flats. This is important for 
the analysis. If the actual rents per square meter were substantially lower than the rent ceilings 
used to calculate the HA, changes in the rent ceilings should not be expected to influence 
rents. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the proportionate differences between actual rents 
and the rent ceiling in our main estimation sample. 
                                                 
7 A series of municipal mergers took place in Finland during the time period of the study. Most importantly, in 
the beginning of 2009, some 70 small municipalities merged with larger ones and are likely to have moved from 
affordability region 4 to region 3 as a result of the merger.  
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Figure 4. Actual rents relative to the rent ceiling.  
Figure 1 in the Introduction showed that the discontinuities in rent ceiling cause clear 
discontinuities in actual HA. The discontinuities in the rent ceiling shown in Figure 3 are 
somewhat stronger.  There are three main reasons for this. First, as Figure 4 shows, the rent 
ceiling is not always binding and hence the HA does not change at the cut-off. Second, the 
HA also depends on the income of the household through the deductible. In addition, even 
when the deductible is zero, the HA only covers 80% of the rent up to the rent ceiling. 
Nevertheless, individual jumps are clearly visible and economically significant for low-
income households. 
Our data cannot be used to assess the importance of HA for the entire private rental market 
because they only include information on HA recipients. Based on additional calculations 
using the Income Distribution Survey data (IDS)8 for the same time period, the share of HA 
recipients was slightly below 20% in the kind of flats included in our main estimation sample. 
The share varies by affordability region and the type of dwelling. 
                                                 
8 The IDS data are a representative sample of Finnish households with an annual sample size of about 10,000 
households. 
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Table 2 shows summary statistics for the main variables for our main estimation sample. With 
the above restrictions, there are some 273,000 observations in the data (83,620 recipients and 
73,819 flats). The mean rent is roughly 434 euros/month and the mean floor area 32 square 
meters. On average, the HA is some 226 euros/month which implies that the average net rent 
(or out-of-pocket rent) is roughly 208 euros/month.  
Table 2. Summary statistics for the main estimation sample (N = 272,941).  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Rent ceiling/m2  11.07  1.48  7.73  15.35 
Rent (EUR per month)  433.96  107.22  61.74  1580.00 
Rent/m2  14.07  4.10  2.00  39.74 
HA (EUR per month)  225.70  73.11  16.83  481.60 
HA/m2  7.27  2.40  0.42  17.17 
Net rent (EUR per month)  208.26  112.52  12.35  1354.40 
Net rent/m2  6.80  3.92  0.40  34.44 
Floor area  31.53  4.87  21.00  40.50 
Floor area>25.9  0.87  0.34  0.00  1.00 
Floor area>30.9  0.57  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Floor area>35.9  0.22  0.42  0.00  1.00 
Construction year  1985.10  21.83  1620.00  2013.00 
Age of recipient  32.98  12.28  16.00  66.00 
Household size  1.04  0.23  1.00  8.00 
Deductible (EUR per month)  46.63  83.19  0.00  468.00 
Hh income excluding HA (EUR per month)  561.03  349.35  0.00  2156.00 
Rent ceiling binding  0.83  0.38  0.00  1.00 
HA paid to landlord  0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Private owner  0.74  0.44  0.00  1.00 
Integer floor area  0.76  0.43  0.00  1.00 
Affordability region 1  0.21  0.41  0.00  1.00 
Affordability region 2  0.05  0.23  0.00  1.00 
Affordability region 3  0.74  0.44  0.00  1.00 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the expected benefits of adjusting housing choices according to the 
HA scheme depend on how persistent the recipient status is expected to be. Table 3 reports 
observed lengths of HA spells starting in 2009.9 Approximately 28% do not continue as HA 
recipients in 2010 and for another 29% the spell discontinues before 2011. Thus for the 
                                                 
9 The sample used to produce Table 3 includes recipients who were in our estimation sample in 2009 but did not 
receive HA in 2008. The length of spell is calculated so that it is not affected by attrition from the estimation 
sample (e.g. through moving to another area or to a larger dwelling). 
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majority of HA recipients, the subsidy appears to serve as temporary assistance. On the other 
hand, some 23% continue as recipients for five or more years. 
Table 3. Length of HA spells starting in 2009 
Length of HA spell  Percent  Cumulative percentage
1 year  28.19  28.19 
2 years  29.4  57.58 
3 years  12.58  70.17 
4 years  6.81  76.97 
5 or more years  23.03  100 
 
4.2 Empirical strategy 
Estimating the effect of housing allowance on rents is challenging because typically, other 
things equal, the housing allowance is bigger if the rent is higher. This reverse causality 
implies that simple OLS regression gives biased results. In addition, housing allowance is 
likely to be correlated with other factors that affect rent.  
However, the fact that the rent ceiling jumps at certain cut-off points can be used to identify 
the impact of the HA on rent. The idea is to compare rents below and above the cut-off points 
where the HA changes sharply. These discontinuities generate variation in the generosity of 
the housing allowance. The variation is plausibly exogenous because there is no reason, other 
than the HA, to expect the relationship between rents and floor space (or construction year) to 
be stepwise, when we control for smooth but flexible functions of these attributes.  
Our empirical strategy has the features of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) discussed 
in e.g. Lee and Lemieux (2010). However, the setting differs from an ideal RDD in that HA 
recipients can sort into flats with different attributes. The discontinuities may also affect 
selection into the sample.10 Sorting of HA recipients to flats with more generous HA is one of 
the channels through which rents could be affected because such sorting would increase the 
demand for flats where the HA is higher. The standard RDD tests (balancing tests and 
McCrary test) are useful in studying potential sorting. 
                                                 
10 A household with a relatively large deductible may be eligible on the generous side of the cut-off but not on 
the other side. Similarly, the discontinuity in the size of the HA may affect take-up. 
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The main focus of our empirical analysis is on the floor area discontinuities, because visual 
examination of the data shows that the relationship between rent and floor area is smoother 
than the relationship between rent and construction year. Thus, the floor area cut-offs likely 
provide a cleaner source of variation and give more precise estimates. The same methodology 
can be used for the construction year discontinuities. We present the results for the 
construction year discontinuities in Appendix A and discuss the findings briefly after 
analyzing the floor area cut-offs. 
Our sample consists of units with floor area varying from 21m2 to 40.9m2. The sample 
therefore includes the first three floor area cut-offs shown in Table 1 (26m2, 31m2 and 36m2).  
98% of the observations of floor area are concentrated on multiples of 0.5m2 (76% integers). 
We round the observations not divisible by 0.5m2 down to the closest 0.5m2. Thus we have 40 
floor area clusters. Heaping of the observations to integer values may bias our estimation 
results if the likelihood of an integer floor area is correlated with some determinants of rent 
(Barreca et al. 2016). We address this concern by controlling for integer values and testing for 
the robustness of our results for dropping non-integers. 
Our empirical analysis has three steps. First, in order to visualize the discontinuities at the 
floor area cut-offs, we calculate bin averages for rent ceiling, HA, rent, and net rent in our 
sample for the discrete values of floor areas and plot these averages at the floor area values. 
The graphical analysis is presented in Figures 1–3. In each figure, the dots show bin averages 
of these variables and the vertical red lines show the location of the cut-offs where the rent 
ceiling changes. The figures include the fits of second order polynomials estimated separately 
for each group separated by the cut-offs.11  
Second, we estimate the effect of each cut-off on the HA and the rent separately12 using the 
model 
(2)           ௜ܻ ൌ α ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ܦ௝ሺܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ ൐ ܿݑݐ݋݂ ௝݂ሻ୨ ൅ ݂ሺܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ሻ ൅ ߜ′ ௜ܺ ൅ ݑ௜.    
The dependent variable Yi is HA per square meter or rent per square meter in unit i. The 
explanatory variables of interest are the dummy variables D for values above the various floor 
                                                 
11 The regression is weighted by the number of observations in the bin. 
12 Alternatively, we could pool the discontinuities and normalize the floor area to zero at each discontinuity to 
estimate a pooled RD treatment effect. Our strategy is preferable because it fully exploits the information 
available in our multi-cut-off setup (See Cattaneo et al., 2016).  
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area cut-offs. Using floor area group dummies defined in an overlapping way implies that the 
β coefficients can be interpreted as the impact of crossing the cut-off on Yi. We control for the 
direct impact of floor area by including a smooth function f of floor area in the model. The 
function is allowed to vary between the cut-offs. In order to allow for a straightforward 
interpretation of the β coefficients, the function f is in practice modeled through an 
overlapping sequence of floor area variables normalized to zero at the cut-offs. These 
normalized floor area variables are interacted with the respective floor area group dummies:   
(3)           ݂ሺܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ሻ ൌ ݃଴ሺܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ሻ ൅ ∑ ሾܦ௝ሺܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ ൐ ܿݑݐ݋݂ ௝݂ሻ୨ ∗
																																		݃௝ሺܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ െ ܿݑݐ݋݂ ௝݂ሻሿ. 
Other control variables in Xi include municipality-specific year fixed effects, postcode fixed 
effects and affordability group-specific dummies for construction year dummies, type of land 
lord (an individual or a firm) and integer value of floor area. We include these control 
variables in all specifications to gain precision. In addition, some specifications include 
characteristics of recipient households (income, household size and age of household head). 
Finally, we quantify the impact of HA on rent through instrumental variables regression 
where we use the discontinuities as exogenous instruments for HA. The first stage of the IV 
regression is model (2) with HA as the dependent variable. The floor area group dummies are 
the excluded instruments. In the second stage, we estimate the model:   
(4)           ܴ௜ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܪܣ෢ ௜ ൅ ݂ሺܨ݈݋݋ݎ	ܽݎ݁ܽ௜ሻ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ ൅ ݑ௜, 
where Ri is the rent per square meter and the regressors are the predicted HA from the first 
stage together with polynomials of floor area and other controls. 
This kind of IV regression arguably solves the reverse causality and omitted variables issues 
and gives an estimate of the impact of HA on rent isolated from other determinants of rent.  
The identifying assumption is that the floor area cut-off dummies are orthogonal to the error 
term. This should be the case if other determinants of HA develop smoothly with respect to 
floor area and are therefore captured by the f function. The main worry here is that sorting and 
sample selection might lead to discontinuities in the background characteristics. This can be 
examined through balance of covariates tests where we use characteristics of the dwellings 
and HA recipients as dependent variables in model (2).  
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As discussed above, our assignment variable is discrete. This means that we cannot compare 
the means of the dependent variable just below and above the cut-offs. The conditions for 
non-parametric or semi-parametric methods are not satisfied (Lee and Card, 2008). Thus we 
are forced to perform simple parametric RDD analysis, where we choose a functional form for 
the relationship between the assignment variable and the outcome variable. We use 1st and 2nd 
order polynomials which are allowed to vary between the cut-offs in our main tables. The use 
of higher order polynomials would likely lead to overfitting, but we report specifications with 
all (81) combinations of 1st–3rd order polynomials for the four intervals separated by the cut-
offs as a robustness check. 
The discreteness of the assignment variable also has implications for statistical inference. As 
pointed out by Lee and Card (2008), specification errors in the fitted regression line imply 
that at each discrete value there is an error component positively correlated within 
observations at that particular point. As a result, conventional standard errors are downward-
biased. Therefore, we cluster standard errors at discrete values of floor area. 
4.3 Results 
Our graphical analysis (Figures 1–3) shows that there are clear discontinuities in the rent 
ceilings and actual HA received at the floor area cut-offs. It also suggests that these 
differences in the generosity of the HA system do not translate into differences in relative 
rents.  
We now turn to regression analysis where we estimate the size of the discontinuities in HA 
and rents at the cut-offs, and estimate the impact of HA on rent utilizing the three 
discontinuities as instruments for HA.  
Table 4 shows the estimation results for model (2). The coefficients are changes in HA, in 
rent or in net rent in euros (per square meter per month) when crossing the floor area cut-offs. 
Columns 1–4 report the effect of crossing the cut-offs on HA per square meter and columns 
5–8 show the effect on rent per square meter. For both outcomes, we consider four different 
specifications. To gain precision, all the specifications include construction year dummies 
interacted with affordability group, a dummy for integer values of floor area interacted with 
affordability group, municipality-year fixed effects (34 municipalities and 6 years) and 
postcode fixed effects (799 postcodes). The first specification is a naïve regression where we 
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do not control for floor area. In the second and the third specifications, we add 1st and 2nd 
order polynomials of floor area. The last specification includes household characteristics as 
additional controls. For the third outcome, the net rent per square meter per month in column 
9, we report only the third specification without the household characteristics.  
The first four columns show that there are clear and statistically significant jumps in HA per 
square meter at all three cut-offs. The units are euros/m2 per month. Comparisons of the 
jumps in HA with the mean income and HA reported in Table 2 indicates that the jumps are 
not large but not negligible either. For example, crossing the first cut-off implies on average a 
15 euro reduction in the monthly HA (26m2 * 0.576 euros/m2) which corresponds to a 6.7% 
decrease in HA or 1.9% decrease in income (including HA).  
Turning to the rent per square meter in columns 5–8, all the coefficients are negative and 
significant in the naïve regression of column 5 where we do not control for floor area. In 
column 6, where this effect is controlled for using the 1st order polynomials, there is one 
significant coefficient with a counterintuitive sign. With the 2nd order polynomials in column 
7, all the coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant and have reasonably 
narrow confidence intervals. Adding household characteristics in column 8 has little effect on 
the results.  
Column 9 shows that crossing the floor area cut-offs has a statistically significant effect on 
the net rent (the difference between the actual rent and the HA) of the recipient households. 
At all the cut-offs, households just to the right of the cut-off have higher housing expenses 
after the housing allowance has been taken into account than those just to the left of the cut-
off.   
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Table 4. Discontinuities in HA, rent and net rent (1st stage and reduced form of IV regression). 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Dep var  HA/m2  HA/m2  HA/m2  HA/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Net Rent/m2 
Floor area>25.9  ‐0.786***  ‐0.527***  ‐0.497***  ‐0.576***  ‐2.232***  0.263*** ‐0.134  ‐0.152  0.363**  
[0.042]  [0.033]  [0.062]  [0.038]  [0.390]  [0.093]  [0.159]  [0.167]  [0.156]    
Floor area>30.9  ‐0.662***  ‐0.409***  ‐0.455***  ‐0.575***  ‐1.331***  0.118  0.193  0.165  0.648*** 
[0.042]  [0.037]  [0.066]  [0.043]  [0.223]  [0.073]  [0.122]  [0.130]  [0.079]    
Floor area>35.9  ‐0.644***  ‐0.118*  ‐0.224***  ‐0.245***  ‐0.853***  0.127*  ‐0.008  0.024  0.216*** 
[0.104]  [0.068]  [0.076]  [0.042]  [0.144]  [0.070]  [0.084]  [0.081]  [0.057]    
1st stage F  463.7  96.2  50.4  183.8       
N  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941 
Order of polynomials of floor area  No  1st  2nd  2nd  No  1st  2nd  2nd  2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Household characteristics           X           X    
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut‐offs. Dwelling and area characteristics include construction year dummies interacted with 
affordability group, dummy for integer values of floor area interacted with affordability group, municipality‐year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. Household 
characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, household income (pre‐allowance), income squared and household size dummies. Standard errors clustered at 
discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5 shows the result of the IV regression of model (4). The specifications used are the 
same as in Table 4. The first stage F-statistics are high indicating that the instruments are 
strong enough for reliable estimation. The first stage regressions are reported in Table 4. 
Table A5 in the appendix shows the results with all possible combinations of 1st–3rd order 
polynomials of floor area for the intervals between the cut-offs. 
In the first column of Table 5 without the 1st or 2nd order polynomial of the floor area, the 
housing allowance coefficient is positive and significant. Adding the 1st and 2nd order 
polynomials first turns the estimate negative and significant and then brings it close to zero.  
In column 5, the dependent variable is the net rent per square meter. The results indicate that a 
higher HA translates roughly one-to-one into a lower net rent.  
Table 5. IV results on the effect of housing allowance on rents.  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dep var  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Net Rent/m2 
HA/m2  2.043***  ‐0.395**  ‐0.14  ‐0.1  ‐1.140*** 
[0.122]  [0.170]  [0.178]  [0.151]  [0.178]    
1st stage F  463.7  96.2  50.4  183.8  50.4 
N  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941 
Order of polynomials of floor area  No  1st  2nd  2nd  2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics  X  X  X  X  X 
Household characteristics           X    
Notes: Table shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The excluded 
instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut‐offs. 1st stage regressions are shown in Table 4. Dwelling 
and area characteristics include construction year dummies interacted with affordability group, dummy for 
integer values of floor area interacted with affordability group, municipality‐year fixed effects and postcode 
fixed effects. Household characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, household income (pre‐
allowance), income squared and household size dummies. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor 
area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Results for sub-groups 
As discussed in Section 2, there are reasons to expect that the effects of HA on rents are 
heterogeneous and depend on the circumstances of the household. In Table 6, we repeat the 
analysis discussed above for various sub-samples based on recipient and unit characteristics. 
The first panel shows the IV estimates for the effects of HA on rents (corresponding to 
column 3 in Table 5) and the second panel the reduced form of the IV regressions 
(corresponding to column 7 in Table 4). 
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In the first column, we limit the sample to those 26% of the HA recipients whose HA is paid 
directly to the landlord. In the second and the third columns, we divide the sample into two 
groups based on income: those with incomes lower and higher than the mean income. This is 
because the details of the housing allowance system might be less important for those with 
very low incomes as they are eligible for social assistance covering their housing costs. In the 
fourth and fifth columns, we focus on those flats and recipient households that appear 
regularly (in at least five out of six years) in our data. The rationale is that one might not 
expect HA to influence willingness to pay for different types of units or housing consumption 
choices if the household’s reliance on the HA is very short term. While we cannot know what 
the expectations of the recipient households are when they make their housing consumption 
choices, we can examine whether the effects are different for those who end up receiving HA 
for extended durations. Finally, in columns 6 and 7 we consider the effects separately for 
those with a private individual and a corporation as their landlord. The effects could be 
different as institutional landlords are more likely to use posted rents as opposed to bargaining 
while private landlords might be more willing to negotiate with potential tenants.    
Starting from the reduced form of the IV estimates in the lower panel, there is some evidence 
of rent effects for long-term HA recipients and flats inhabited by HA recipients for longer 
periods. In these groups, there is a statistically significant (at the 5% level) downward shift in 
rent at the first cut-off, and also at the third cut-off for the long term HA flat group. In the 
other groups, none of the coefficients for crossing the floor area cut-offs are significant, apart 
from one with a counterintuitive sign in column 7. Despite some significant coefficients in the 
reduced form regressions, all the IV estimates in the upper panel are insignificant. The results 
are not entirely conclusive for some sub-groups because the standard errors are rather high. 
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Table 6. Estimated effect of HA on rent in sub-groups. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Sub‐sample 
HA paid to 
landlord 
Below mean 
income 
Above mean 
income 
Flat in data in 5 or 
more years 
Recipient in data in 5 or 
more years 
Private 
landlord 
Firm 
landlord 
Dep var  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2 
Panel A: IV results                   
HA/m2  0.024  ‐0.096  ‐0.195  0.27  0.164  ‐0.057  ‐0.775 
[0.330]  [0.121]  [0.277]  [0.250]  [0.270]  [0.104]  [0.499] 
1st stage F  45.2  403.4  44.4  17.6  23.1  82.3  4.7 
N  71514  125758  147183  101484  114173  200709  72232 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV                
Floor area>25.9  ‐0.295  ‐0.01  ‐0.268  ‐0.638**  ‐0.468**  0.031  ‐0.387 
[0.292]  [0.135]  [0.225]  [0.259]  [0.207]  [0.084]  [0.486]    
Floor area>30.9  0.187  0.083  0.278  0.369*  0.316  0.011  0.605*** 
[0.256]  [0.088]  [0.171]  [0.217]  [0.241]  [0.086]  [0.217]    
Floor area>35.9  0.106  0.037  ‐0.025  ‐0.257*  ‐0.218**  0.044  0.072 
[0.134]  [0.115]  [0.078]  [0.138]  [0.098]  [0.087]  [0.141]    
N  71514  125758  147183  101484  114173  200709  72232 
Order of polynomials of 
floor area  2nd  2nd  2nd  2nd  2nd  2nd  2nd 
Dwelling and area 
characteristics  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Notes: Panel A shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The excluded instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut‐offs.  
Panel B shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut‐offs from a regression of Rent/m2 on floor area group dummies and controls. Dwelling and area 
characteristics include construction year dummies interacted with affordability group, dummy for integer values of floor area interacted with affordability group, 
municipality‐year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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All the results above concern tenants in the private rental market. Table A4 in Appendix A 
reports estimates for municipality owned housing and for privately-owned subsidized 
housing. The reduced form of IV estimates might suggest some impact on rents in the 
privately-owned subsidized housing at one of the cut-offs, but the IV estimates are 
insignificant for both sectors. In both cases, the first stage F values are low which is not 
surprising as the rent ceiling is much less frequently binding in the social housing sector than 
in the private rental market. Also the share of very small flats is smaller than the private rental 
market. Accordingly, the standard errors are large especially at the first floor area cut-off.  
Construction year cut-offs 
The analysis above utilizes variation due to discontinuities in HA at floor area cutoffs. The 
effects might differ for other types of variation in HA. For example, the dependence of HA on 
other characteristics might trigger rent responses if the demand for these characteristics is 
more price elastic than the demand for housing space. Collison and Ganong (2016), for 
instance, study a reform which made the US housing voucher system more generous in 
expensive neighborhoods and less generous in low-cost neighborhoods, and find evidence of 
demand and price responses. Brewer et al. (2014) argue that variation in the incidence is 
explained by differences in demand elasticities across recipient groups. 
The stepwise dependence of HA on construction year of the dwelling offers an additional 
source of variation in HA13. We repeat the analysis presented and discussed above using the 
cut-offs for the year of construction or major renovation (henceforth construction year) in the 
appendix. There are two construction year cut-offs in the scheme, in 1986 and 1996. For the 
analysis, we restrict the sample to a +/- 10 year band around these cut-offs (flats built between 
1975 and 2006) which reduces the sample size from roughly 273,000 to 132,086.  
Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix A show that the discontinuity in HA is particularly strong at 
the 1986 cut-off. In Figure A3, there is some indication of an upward shift in rents at the first 
cut-off, but no sign of a jump in rents at the second cut-off. The figure also reveals that there 
is substantial variation in rents and the relationship between rents and construction year does 
not appear to be very smooth. Thus the analysis utilizing the floor area discontinuities is likely 
to be more reliable. Table A1 shows estimates of the discontinuities in HA and rent and Table 
                                                 
13 Variation in HA generosity across the borders of the four affordability regions is probably not exogenous in 
Finland because the borders coincide with municipality borders where other determinants of rents, such as local 
taxes and public services, change at the same time. Moreover, RDD type analysis might not be feasible because 
the rental market is often thin in border areas which are typically outside urban areas. 
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A2 reports the IV estimates. According to columns 7 and 8 in Table A1, there is a jump in the 
rent at the second cut-off but not at the first cut-off where the discontinuity in HA is larger. 
The IV estimates are close to zero and insignificant. Overall, the results are in line with the 
findings of the analysis based on the floor area cut-offs. 
Relationship with previous Finnish studies 
The finding that differences in the level of HA do not capitalize into rents is in contrast with 
many previous studies including two Finnish studies (Viren, 2013, and Kangasharju, 2010). 
Viren (2013) uses similar (but smaller) register data on HA recipients as we do for an earlier 
time period. The analysis exploits the whole range of variation embedded in the rent ceiling 
differences.14 He estimates reduced form models of rent on maximum achievable HA and 
various controls. As regards floor area and construction year, his controls include only the 
first order terms fitted over the whole support of the distribution of floor area and construction 
year. In the light of our analysis, this is clearly insufficient to capture the underlying 
relationship between these attributes and rents. We, on the other hand, focus on data close to 
cut-offs where rent ceilings have important impact on actual HA and generate plausibly 
exogenous variation in the allowance. We also control for the running variables in a more 
flexible way and perform extensive robustness and validity checks. Therefore, we argue that 
the internal validity of the analysis is higher here than in Viren (2013).  
Kangasharju (2010) in turn studies a reform which increased the rent ceilings in 2002 using 
the Income Distribution Statistics data which combines register data and survey elements. The 
IDS is a representative sample of Finish households and contains both HA recipient and non-
recipient households. The study presents differences-in-differences results based on the 
comparison rental rates of recipient and non-recipient households before and after the reform 
as well as an instrumental variable estimation exploiting the variation in the changes in the 
rent ceiling. The main result is that one additional euro in HA led to a 60–70 cent increase in 
the rents paid by the recipient household. In Appendix B of this paper, we repeat the analysis 
of the 2002 reform using the same data and the methods described in Kangasharju (2010) but 
find different results. In particular, we do not find evidence of large rent effects.  
  
                                                 
14 The discussion presenting the empirical strategy in Viren (2013) is not very detailed and hence it is not 
entirely clear what the sources of identifying variation are. 
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4.4 Robustness and validity 
In this section, we report the results of robustness checks. We also discuss internal validity (in 
particular, the possible manipulation of the assignment variable close to the cut-offs and the 
balance of the covariates by treatment status) and external validity of the results.  
Internal validity 
The existence of the floor area cut-offs at which the rent ceiling changes may, at least in 
principle, induce behavioral responses both on the demand and on the supply side. When 
thinking about the supply, two issues should be discussed. First, the ability of landlords or 
tenants to manipulate floor area (reported to Kela) could invalidate our RD analysis. The 
concern would be that units with floor area just above the cut-offs are reported to have floor 
area below the cut-off for the unit to qualify for a higher HA. Second, if the construction of 
new units responds to this incentive, over time, the whole rental housing stock could start to 
reflect these cut-offs in the system. Another potential channel through which the rental 
housing stock can adjust is the conversion of owner-occupied units to rental units and vice 
versa.  
In addition, it is possible that the cut-offs also lead to sorting by inducing changes in the level 
of the HA and thereby in the net rents. Because non-claimants and claimants face different 
incentives, the claimants could be expected to be over-represented just below the floor area 
cut-offs. 
All these different ways of manipulating the assignment variable should show up as 
discontinuities in the distribution of floor area at the cut-offs. We examine the distribution in 
Figure 5 and in Table 7.  
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Figure 5. Distribution of floor area of HA recipient households. 
Figure 5 shows that there are spikes in the distribution at round values 25, 30 and 35 just 
below the cut-offs, but there is a similar spike at 40 square meters with no floor area cut-off 
(and also at 20 square meters, which is not shown in the figure). The figure also shows that 
integers are in general much more common than half-integers. In general, based on the figure, 
it seems that there are no abnormal jumps in the distribution at the cut-offs.  
Table 7 shows the change in the number of observations (and log of number of observations) 
when crossing the cut-offs when we control for 2nd order polynomials of floor area. A dummy 
for integer values is included as a control, because otherwise the presence of integers just to 
the right of cut-offs could bias the test. The table confirms that there are no statistically 
significant jumps in the density of floor area at the cut-offs.  
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Table 7. Tests for discontinuities in the density of floor area. 
   (1)  (2) 
Dep var  Number of observations  Ln(Number of observations) 
Floor area>25.9  ‐388.017  0.132 
[1492.702]  [0.294] 
Floor area>30.9  ‐2485.19  ‐0.202 
[5996.131]  [0.348] 
Floor area>35.9  ‐520.999  ‐0.178 
   [1187.473]  [0.158] 
N  40  40 
Order of polynomial of floor area  2nd  2nd 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut‐offs. Dummy for integer values of 
floor area included as a control. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors  are in brackets * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
We then turn to characteristics of the dwelling and the tenant household. Figure 6 and Table 8 
report the balance of covariates tests for some household characteristics (household age, size 
and income). They also show the construction year, share of units located in Helsinki and 
share of private owners at different floor areas. The construction year and Helsinki dummy 
are of particular interest because the rent ceiling depends not only on the floor area but also on 
the construction year and affordability group. 
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Figure 6. Discontinuities in dwelling and household characteristics. 
Figure 6 shows that in general larger units tend to be located in newer buildings are less likely 
to be located in Helsinki and more likely to have a private owner. Also, as to be expected, 
households in larger units are older, larger and have higher incomes.  
Table 8 shows that the year of construction, dummy for Helsinki and dummy for private 
owner are balanced at the cut-offs but for household characteristics there are statistically 
significant jumps at some of the cut-offs, indicating that there may be sorting based on 
household characteristics into different floor area groups. The fact that the sign of the jumps 
varies between cut-offs, however, suggests that an alternative reason is that standard errors are 
downward biased for household characteristics because errors are correlated within household 
and the same households are observed many times. Table A3 in Appendix A shows that only 
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one of the coefficients is significant at the 5% level when we cluster standard errors at the 
household level. Using household level clustering in our main analysis leads to lower standard 
errors, and thus, we hold to the more conservative floor area clustering.   
 
Table 8. Balance of covariates tests. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dep var 
Year of 
construction  Helsinki 
Private 
owner  Age  hh size  hh income
Floor area>25.9  0.377  0.052  ‐0.002  ‐0.293  0.009***  14.5 
[2.821]  [0.103]  [0.039]  [0.619]  [0.003]  [11.503] 
Floor area>30.9  1.039  0.000  0.069  ‐2.270***  0.005  ‐17.281** 
[1.393]  [0.035]  [0.046]  [0.510]  [0.003]  [6.866] 
Floor area>35.9  0.235  ‐0.029  0.029  0.409  ‐0.012**  0.205 
[1.829]  [0.024]  [0.034]  [0.534]  [0.006]  [5.008] 
N  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941  272941 
Order of polynomial  
of floor area  2nd  2nd  2nd  2nd  2nd  2nd 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut‐offs. Standard errors clustered at 
discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 9 addresses the concern that non-random heaping of data to integer values of floor area 
might bias our results. We control for integer values through a dummy variable in all 
regressions but this might not be sufficient. As suggested by Barreca et al. (2016), we report 
the IV and reduced form of IV estimates for a sample limited to integers of floor area in Table 
9. The results are very similar to the corresponding specification in Tables 4 and 5. Note that 
the standard errors in Table 9 are likely to be downward biased due to the low number of 
clusters (20 instead of 40). 
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Table 9. Integers only sample. 
   (1) 
Integer values of floor area only 
Dep var  Rent/m2 
Panel A: IV results 
HA/m2  ‐0.063 
[0.080] 
1st stage F  130.5 
N  204432 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV 
Floor area>25.9  ‐0.009 
[0.115] 
Floor area>30.9  0.031 
[0.050] 
Floor area>35.9  0.088 
[0.083] 
Order of polynomials of floor area  2nd 
Dwelling characteristics  X 
Notes: Panel A shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. 
The excluded instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut‐offs.  Panel B shows 
coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut‐offs from a regression of Rent/m2 on 
floor area group dummies and controls. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor 
area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Finally, we analyze the robustness of the IV estimates to functional form of floor area by 
reporting specifications with all combinations of 1st–3rd order polynomials for the four 
intervals separated by the three floor area cut-offs as a robustness check (81 specifications 
altogether). The findings are reported in Table A5. We do not find positive point estimates in 
any of the specifications. There are some counterintuitive negative and significant estimates 
when we use a 1st order polynomial for the first interval. With intermediate degrees of 
flexibility we find small and insignificant estimates similar to our main specifications. With 
higher order polynomials the point estimates tend to move further away from zero but remain 
statistically insignificant. 
External validity 
Our results suggest that the incidence of differences in HA due to discontinuities in the 
Finnish HA scheme is on the tenant. The results may be generalizable to other settings where 
HA depends on characteristics of the dwelling or characteristics of the household, such as 
household size and income. The findings are not informative whether the demand increase 
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due to the existence of the HA scheme affects the overall rent level or whether HA recipients 
pay a premium relative to non-recipients. 
5 Conclusions	
We study the effect of housing demand subsidies on rents exploiting the stepwise nature of 
the Finnish HA scheme. During the time period of the study, the HA system featured 
discontinuities in the rent ceiling per square meter as a function of the floor area of the unit. 
These discontinuities are informative of whether the HA capitalizes into rents because there is 
no other reason to expect the relationship between rents and unit size to be stepwise. 
The discontinuities in the amount of HA at cut-offs studied are economically and statistically 
significant. However, we do not find evidence of discontinuities in rents at these cut-offs 
when focusing on HA recipient households in the private rental housing market. Instead, it 
seems that differences in the size of the housing allowance are translated into differences in 
the out-of-pocket rent of the recipient households.   
More generally, while our results are not informative about the effects of the overall size of 
the housing allowance system, they do suggest that the incidence of small changes in the 
parameters of the system is largely on the tenants. In our subsample analysis, we find some 
indication of rent effects when we focus on long term HA recipients or flats inhabited by HA 
recipients for several years. This suggests that the dynamics of recipient status and the rental 
markets may matter for the incidence of HA.  
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Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables 
 
Figure A1. Construction year and rent ceiling. 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Construction year and HA per square meter. 
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Figure A3. Construction year and rent per square meter 
 
 
Figure A4. Distribution of construction year. 
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Table A1. Discontinuities in HA, rent and net rent (1st stage and reduced form of IV regression, construction year cut-offs).  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Dep var  HA/m2  HA/m2  HA/m2  HA/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Net Rent/m2 
Construction or renovation year>1986  0.652***  0.770***  0.799***  0.731***  0.161  0.464***  ‐0.143  ‐0.089  ‐0.942*** 
[0.045]  [0.067]  [0.081]  [0.042]  [0.104]  [0.159]  [0.177]  [0.177]  [0.179]    
Construction or renovation year>1996  0.281***  0.247***  0.152**  0.409***  0.218**  0.204**  0.373**  0.332**  0.221 
   [0.032]  [0.049]  [0.072]  [0.039]  [0.086]  [0.084]  [0.146]  [0.144]  [0.144]    
1st stage F  242.6  68.5  52.5  307.3                
N  132086  132086  132086  132086  132086  132086  132086  132086  132086 
Order of polynomials of floor area  No  1st  2nd  2nd  No  1st  2nd  2nd  2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Household characteristics           X           X    
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut‐offs. Dwelling and area characteristics include floor area dummies interacted with affordability 
group, municipality‐year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. Household characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, household income (pre‐allowance), 
income squared and household size dummies. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A2. IV results on the effect of housing allowance on rents (construction year cut-offs).  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dep var  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Rent/m2  Net Rent/m2 
HA/m2  0.415***  0.618***  0.071  0.229  ‐0.929*** 
[0.095]  [0.213]  [0.221]  [0.173]  [0.221]    
1st stage F  242.6  68.5  52.5  307.3  52.5 
N  132086  132086  132086  132086  132086 
Order of polynomials of floor area  No  1st  2nd  2nd  2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics  X  X  X  X  X 
Household characteristics           X    
Notes: Table shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The excluded 
instruments are the two dummies for construction year cut‐offs. 1st stage regressions are shown in Table 3. 
Dwelling and area characteristics include floor area dummies interacted with affordability group, municipality‐
year fixed effects and postcode fixed effects. Household characteristics include age of recipient, age squared, 
household income (pre‐allowance), income squared and household size dummies. Standard errors clustered at 
discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table A3. Balance of covariates tests, clustering at household level. 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep var  Age  hh size  hh income 
Floor area>25.9  ‐0.293  0.009  14.5 
[0.619]  [0.006]  [13.764] 
Floor area>30.9  ‐2.270***  0.005  ‐17.281* 
[0.447]  [0.005]  [9.372] 
Floor area>35.9  0.409  ‐0.012*  0.205 
[0.484]  [0.007]  [10.938] 
N  272941  272941  272941 
Order of polynomial of floor area  2nd  2nd  2nd 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the dummies for crossing floor area cut‐offs. Standard errors clustered at 
household level are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A4. Estimated effect of HA on rent in the social housing sector. 
   (1)  (2) 
Municipalities  Non‐profit organisations 
Dep var  Rent/m2  Rent/m2 
Panel A: IV results    
HA/m2  0.581  0.445* 
[0.516]  [0.258] 
1st stage F  2.6  9.2 
N  93369  65110 
Panel B: Reduced form of IV 
Floor area>25.9  0.128  0.854 
[0.437]  [0.599]    
Floor area>30.9  ‐0.165  0.550*   
[0.193]  [0.305]    
Floor area>35.9  ‐0.012  ‐0.450*** 
[0.057]  [0.175]    
Order of polynomials of floor area  2nd  2nd 
Dwelling and area characteristics  X  X 
Notes: Panel A shows IV regression results on the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2 and net rent/m2. The excluded 
instruments are the three dummies for floor area cut‐offs.  Panel B shows coefficients on the dummies for 
crossing floor area cut‐offs from a regression of Rent/m2 on floor area group dummies and controls. Standard 
errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A5. Robustness of IV estimates to functional form. (Model title indicates the order of 
polynomial used for each interval around the cut-offs.) 
IV1111  IV1112  IV1113  IV1121  IV1122  IV1123  IV1131  IV1132  IV1133    
‐0.395**  ‐0.414**  ‐0.412**  ‐0.463*** ‐0.450*** ‐0.434*** ‐0.464*** ‐0.428***  ‐0.462***
[0.170]  [0.168]  [0.163]  [0.140]  [0.136]  [0.133]  [0.138]  [0.136]  [0.136]    
IV1211  IV1212  IV1213  IV1221  IV1222  IV1223  IV1231  IV1232  IV1233    
‐0.379**  ‐0.372**  ‐0.369**  ‐0.458*** ‐0.442*** ‐0.427*** ‐0.455*** ‐0.420***  ‐0.453***
[0.172]  [0.172]  [0.168]  [0.155]  [0.150]  [0.147]  [0.152]  [0.147]  [0.147]    
IV1311  IV1312  IV1313  IV1321  IV1322  IV1323  IV1331  IV1332  IV1333    
‐0.390**  ‐0.405***  ‐0.393***  ‐0.468*** ‐0.470*** ‐0.535*** ‐0.549*** ‐0.475***  ‐0.524***
[0.163]  [0.151]  [0.149]  [0.154]  [0.163]  [0.161]  [0.172]  [0.174]  [0.174]    
IV2111  IV2112  IV2113  IV2121  IV2122  IV2123  IV2131  IV2132  IV2133 
‐0.242  ‐0.225  ‐0.223  ‐0.285  ‐0.269  ‐0.255  ‐0.283  ‐0.252  ‐0.283 
[0.170]  [0.164]  [0.162]  [0.186]  [0.177]  [0.174]  [0.179]  [0.174]  [0.174] 
IV2211  IV2212  IV2213  IV2221  IV2222  IV2223  IV2231  IV2232  IV2233 
‐0.08  ‐0.091  ‐0.09  ‐0.156  ‐0.14  ‐0.129  ‐0.149  ‐0.108  ‐0.124 
[0.157]  [0.156]  [0.154]  [0.188]  [0.178]  [0.172]  [0.184]  [0.176]  [0.183] 
IV2311  IV2312  IV2313  IV2321  IV2322  IV2323  IV2331  IV2332  IV2333 
‐0.12  ‐0.124  ‐0.118  ‐0.15  ‐0.088  ‐0.089  ‐0.085  ‐0.029  ‐0.044 
[0.169]  [0.167]  [0.162]  [0.189]  [0.237]  [0.261]  [0.285]  [0.249]  [0.270] 
IV3111  IV3112  IV3113  IV3121  IV3122  IV3123  IV3131  IV3132  IV3133 
‐0.146  ‐0.155  ‐0.146  ‐0.218  ‐0.233  ‐0.213  ‐0.207  ‐0.167  ‐0.184 
[0.190]  [0.193]  [0.187]  [0.165]  [0.165]  [0.158]  [0.168]  [0.162]  [0.167] 
IV3211  IV3212  IV3213  IV3221  IV3222  IV3223  IV3231  IV3232  IV3233 
‐0.114  ‐0.114  ‐0.109  ‐0.163  ‐0.264  ‐0.373  ‐0.521  ‐0.357  ‐0.441 
[0.168]  [0.165]  [0.161]  [0.195]  [0.278]  [0.330]  [0.394]  [0.340]  [0.388] 
IV3311  IV3312  IV3313  IV3321  IV3322  IV3323  IV3331  IV3332  IV3333 
‐0.264  ‐0.309  ‐0.291  ‐0.398  ‐0.377  ‐0.476  ‐0.498  ‐0.345  ‐0.441 
[0.220]  [0.211]  [0.198]  [0.301]  [0.300]  [0.357]  [0.483]  [0.320]  [0.399] 
Notes: Table shows  IV regression results on  the effect of HA/m2 on rent/m2. Model  titles  indicate the 
polynomials used  for each  interval of  floor area  separated by  the cut‐offs. For example  IV2222 means 
that  we  use  a  second  order  polynomial  for  all  four  intervals.  Controls  include  dwelling  and  area 
characteristics: construction year dummies interacted with affordability group, dummy for integer values 
of  floor  area  interacted  with  affordability  group,  municipality‐year  fixed  effects  and  postcode  fixed 
effects. Standard errors clustered at discrete values of floor area are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01 
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Appendix B: Robustness analysis of Kangasharju (2010)  
In this appendix, we study the robustness of the findings of Kangasharju (2010) (henceforth 
K2010) by analyzing the 2002 reform using the same data. The program code used in K2010 
was not available to us but we follow the methodology as reported in the paper. We focus on 
Table 8 and 9 of the original paper.  
We end up with a substantially larger estimation sample than K2010. Thus, using the 
terminology suggested by Clemens (2017) our analysis is perhaps better interpreted as a 
robustness check by reanalyzing the data than as a replication. The reason for the difference in 
sample size is not known to us but probably reflects differences in choices made when 
constructing the estimation sample (not all choices are reported in K2010).  
The 2002 reform 
The reform divided the HMA into two regions: the city of Helsinki (affordability region 1) 
and the rest of the metropolitan area (affordability region 2). In addition, the reform reduced 
the number of construction year cut-offs from three to two and divided the first floor area 
group (flats smaller than 36m
2
) into three different groups (smaller than 25.9m
2
, 26–30.9m2 
and 31–35.9m2). But most importantly for the identification of the effects of HA on rents, the 
reform increased the rent ceilings with varying degrees for all HA recipients. The increases 
were largest for small flats in the city of Helsinki. For instance, for a 25m
2
 flat located in 
Helsinki and built before 1985, the rent ceiling increased from 7.74 euros to 11.25 euros per 
square meter.   
Data 
We use the Income Distribution Statistics data from Statistics Finland for the years 2000–
2003. The data contain roughly 10,000 households and 28,000 individuals each year and 
combines register data with a survey. Each household is present in the data for two 
consecutive years. Information on rents is based on the housing allowance register and the 
survey. 
The data include information on the number of months HA was received, the total annual 
amount of HA and the amount of HA received in December by each member of the 
household. We collapse the data to the household level and sum up the HA variables within 
the household. We define HA recipients as households that, according to the IDS records, 
have received HA within the survey year and have at least one HA month. We drop 
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households with negative HA (due to claw back of excessive HA paid previously), 
households with positive HA but zero HA months, and households with zero HA but positive 
HA months. In addition we drop out households with zero or missing rent.  
Methods 
The main method of K2010 is an instrumental variables regression of rent/m
2
 on HA/m
2
 
where the change in the rent ceiling due to the reform of 2002 is used as an instrument for 
housing allowance. Before the instrumental variables estimation he runs a differences-in-
differences (DiD) regression of ln(rent/m
2
) on a dummy for HA recipient status (Allowance), 
dummy for years 2002 and 2003 after the reform (After), interaction term (Allowance*After) 
and a set of control variables (see K2010, Table A1) interacted with dummies for Helsinki 
and the rest of the HMA. He runs the DiD regression separately for the private rental market 
and social housing units owned by municipalities, and for two time windows around the 
reform (2001–2002 and 2000–2003). In addition, he reports two placebo tests using a two-
year period before the reform (2000–2001) and after the reform (2002–2003). He finds a 
weakly significant positive effect on rents for the two-year window (2001–2002) and a 
significant positive effect for the wider time window (2000–2003) in the private rental 
markets but no impact in the placebo tests or in the municipal social housing sector. 
Table B1 shows our results from a similar DiD analysis. Our estimation sample (N=3641) is 
larger than in K2010 (N=2660).
16
 For the private rental market in the upper panel, we find 
smaller DiD coefficients than K2010. With the 2–year window (2001–2002) our point 
estimate is 0.03 and insignificant (compared with 0.048 with t-value 1.7 in K2010) and with 
the 4–year window our point estimate is 0.035 and significant at the 10% level (K2010’s 
estimate is 0.051 with t-value 2.4). The placebo estimates are similar to K2010.  
Turning to the municipal housing sector in the lower panel, we find positive and significant 
DiD estimates. The results are unexpected since in the municipal rental sector rents should be 
based on maintenance and capital costs and should not be affected by the amount of HA. 
They are also in contrast with K2010’s finding of small and insignificant coefficients. On the 
other hand, as Table B3 below indicates, the changes in the rent ceilings caused by the reform 
are not correlated with the HA variable. This would suggest that the differences in changes in 
                                                 
16
 Apparently, there is an error in the ‘free markets’ 2000–2001 sample size (Column (a) of Table 8 in K2010), 
because the 2000–2001 and 2002–2003 sample sizes should sum up to the ‘All’ sample size. 
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the rental rates of recipient and non-recipient households in the municipal rental sector are not 
driven by the reform.  
Table B1. Reanalysis of the 2002 reform – DiD estimates (cf. K2010 Table 8) 
  Placebo 2-year window Placebo 4-year window 
Period 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2000–03 
Free markets 
   Allowance*After 0.016 0.03 -0.024 0.035*   
 
[0.031] [0.033] [0.028] [0.021]    
R2 0.63 0.613 0.622 0.615 
Sample size 1769 1786 1872 3641 
Number of assisted households 408 323 345 753 
Municipal sector 
   Allowance*After -0.03 0.055** -0.011 0.036**  
 
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.017]    
R2 0.463 0.509 0.491 0.454 
Sample size 1154 1152 1216 2370 
Number of assisted households 392 375 401 793 
Notes: Table shows DiD estimates of the HA reform of 2002. All specifications include control variables listed in 
Kangasharju (2010). Robust standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table B2 reports the IV estimates for the effect of HA on rent. For the ‘Assisted only’ sample 
HA/m
2
 is instrumented with After*Change, where Change is the change in the rent ceiling in 
the 2002 reform for the type of flat inhabited by the household. The main effects of After and 
Change are included in the controls along with the same controls as in the DiD estimation of 
Table B1. For the ‘All’ sample including both HA recipients and non-recipients, the excluded 
instrument is Allowance*After*Change. The main effects and pairwise interactions of 
Allowance, After and Change are controlled for. 
The two first columns of Table B2 show the results for the free market sector (logarithmic 
model in the upper panel and linear model in the lower panel). K2010 reported elasticities of 
0.24 (for assisted only) and 0.31 (for all households) and euro-on-euro effects of roughly 0.7. 
Starting from the ‘assisted only’ sample in the first column of Table B2, our IV estimates are 
smaller than in K2010 and statistically insignificant. Turning to the ‘All’ sample in column 2, 
a notable difference between our analysis and K2010 is that we find low first stage F values 
indicating severe weak instrument problems, whereas he reported very strong first stage F 
values for the ‘All’ sample. The 3rd and 4th column show the results for the municipal social 
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housing sector. Similarly to K2010, the first stage F-statistics are too low for meaningful IV 
estimation. Table B3 reports the first stage results for all IV specifications. 
Table B2. Reanalysis of the 2002 reform – IV estimates (cf. K2010 Table 9) 
  Dep. var. Ln(rent/m2)   
  Free markets Municipal sector   
 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
ln(HA/m2) 0.100 0.463 -1.979 0.017 
 
[0.096] [0.324] [4.696] [0.020] 
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 12.89 3.293 0.167 0.258 
  Dep. var. rent/m2     
  Free markets Municipal sector 
 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
HA/m2 0.321 1.25 3.76 -0.013 
 
[0.212] [1.511] [9.282] [0.065] 
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.344 0.949 0.14 0.044 
Notes: Table shows IV estimates of the effect of HA on rents. The excluded instrument is After*Change (or 
After*Ln(Change) for the ‘Assisted only’ sample, and Allowance*After*Change (or 
Allowance*After*Ln(Change)) for the ‘All’ sample. All specifications include control variables listed in 
Kangasharju (2010), and main effects and pairwise interactions of After, Allowance and Change. First stage 
estimates are shown in Table B3. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table B3. Reanalysis of the 2002 reform – first stage of IV estimates (cf. K2010 Table A3) 
  Dep. var. Ln(HA/m2)   
 
Free markets Municipal sector   
 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
ln(Change)*After 2.336*** 
 
-0.25 
 
 
[0.651] 
 
[0.605] 
 ln(Change)*After*Allowance 1.170* 
 
-0.296 
  
[0.645] 
 
[0.583] 
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 12.89 3.293 0.167 0.258 
  Dep. var. HA/m2     
 
Free markets Municipal sector   
 
Assisted only All Assisted only All 
Change*After 1.559*** 
 
0.13 
 
 
[0.539] 
 
[0.353] 
 Change*After*Allowance 0.435 
 
-0.062 
  
[0.446] 
 
[0.296] 
Sample size 753 3641 793 2370 
First stage F (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.344 0.949 0.14 0.044 
Notes: Table shows the first stage of the IV estimates reported in Table B2. Robust standard errors are in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The conclusion is that the results indicating large effects of HA on rents found in K2010 are 
not robust to reanalysis of the same data following the methods as reported in the paper. The 
results of our reanalysis are consistent with the other findings of this paper suggesting that the 
incidence of differences in HA for different types of dwellings is on the tenant. 
 
 
